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Abstract
We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-
person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the
proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player
and allocates no payoff to the third player, a proposal which is accepted without
delay. Laboratory experiments show various deviations from this equilibrium, where
different offers are typically made and delay may occur before acceptance. We ad-
dress the issue to what extent these findings are compatible with subgame perfect
equilibrium and characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any
value of the discount factor. We show that for any proposal in the interior of the
space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that the proposal is
made and accepted. We characterize the values of the discount factor for which equi-
libria with one-period delay exist. We show that any amount of equilibrium delay is
possible and we construct subgame perfect equilibria such that arbitrary long delay
occurs with probability one.
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1 Introduction
Many decisions in legislatures involve the task of allocating resources among constituencies
with diverse and often opposing preferences. To analyze such decisions, many authors have
studied extensions of the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to collective choice problems,
see for instance Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Harrington (1990), Baron and Kalai (1993),
and Banks and Duggan (2000). These papers study multilateral bargaining games, where
an alternative is accepted if it is approved by a set of players that belongs to a collection
of decisive coalitions. This approach makes it possible to study a variety of important
institutional set-ups, including the one of majority voting.
The Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model, hereafter BF model, is the most frequently used
model to study legislative bargaining. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) consider a bargaining
game with infinite time horizon, where the proposer selection process is modeled by time-
invariant recognition probabilities, and acceptance by a simple majority is sufficient to
implement a proposal. Eraslan (2002) shows that stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs are unique for a rather general specification of the BF model, and Eraslan and
McLennan (2013) show uniqueness of such equilibrium payoffs in an even more general
model. In any stationary equilibrium of the BF model, the proposer offers δ/n to half of
the responding players, nothing to the other responders, and keeps the remainder. Such a
proposal is accepted without delay. The equilibrium therefore predicts substantial proposer
power, the formation of a minimum winning coalition, and absence of delay in reaching an
agreement.
The BF result has been used as the theoretical benchmark in many papers in the
experimental literature. McKelvey (1991) studies a bargaining game with three voters
and a discrete policy space consisting of three alternatives. Fre´chette, Kagel, and Lehrer
(2003) use the BF model with five players as their main treatment and study the effects
of open versus closed amendment rules. Fre´chette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005) use the BF
specification with three players and a discount factor of 1/2 in their treatments, as well as
the case without discounting, and focus on the influence of nominal bargaining power on
bargaining outcomes. Diermeier and Morton (2006) consider a version of the BF model
with a finite time horizon and heterogeneous recognition probabilities. Breitmoser and Tan
(2010) consider the BF specification with three players in their treatments and study in
particular whether fairness can explain some of the experimental findings. Kagel, Sung,
and Winter (2010) are interested in the consequences of veto power in committees and
use the BF specification with three players and a discount factor of 0.95 as a benchmark.
Miller and Vanberg (2013) use the BF model with three players and a discount factor of
0.9 when comparing the costs of reaching agreement under majority and unanimity rule.
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The experimental literature finds that the predictions of the stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium in the BF model are violated in several ways, although certain qualitative
features like the presence of proposer power and a tendency to form minimum winning
coalitions are found. The most striking feature of the data is that proposers make overly
generous offers to the responding players and keep a much smaller share for themselves
than predicted by the stationary equilibrium. Minimum winning coalitions are not always
formed and even an equal sharing of the surplus with all players occurs with significantly
positive probability. Contrary to the BF prediction of immediate acceptance, there is a
significant number of observations with delay before a proposal is accepted, in particular
when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
McKelvey (1991) conjectures that subjects may offer too much to potential coalition
partners because of fear of retaliation in later rounds and Diermeier and Morton (2006)
report the use of non–stationary strategies. For instance, subjects who vote to reject a
proposal on average receive a higher payoff from the new proposal, which is a violation
of stationarity since under stationarity irrelevant parts of the history should be of no in-
fluence to future behavior. Many authors, most notably Rubinstein (1991), have argued
against the use of stationary strategies in bargaining. We are therefore interested in the
question whether proposals like for instance equal sharing of the surplus are compatible
with subgame perfect equilibrium and whether delay is possible in subgame perfect equi-
libria when stationarity is not imposed.
In this paper we study the BF model with three players and we characterize the set of
subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for any value of the discount factor. When the dis-
count factor goes to zero, the set of subgame equilibrium payoffs shrinks to the unit vector
and the entire surplus is allocated to the player who is recognized as the proposer in period
zero. When the discount factor goes to one, the set of subgame equilibria payoffs expands to
the set of feasible payoffs. In particular, all inefficient outcomes are supported as subgame
perfect equilibria when the discount factor is sufficiently high. Our characterization of the
set of subgame perfect equilibrium utilities is entirely constructive.
For any vector in the interior of the set of feasible payoffs there exist a discount factor
such that this vector is proposed and accepted in period 0 in a subgame perfect equilibrium
in pure strategies. Nevertheless, the usual statement of the folk theorem, stating that for
a sufficiently high discount factor any individually rational payoff is a subgame perfect
equilibrium payoff, does not hold in the BF model with three players.
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) prove the folk theorem for a game with at least five players.
It follows from our characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium utilities that
this result does not extend to the case with three players. Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and
Sengupta (1993) consider bargaining in the context of strictly superadditive transferable
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utility games under the rejector–proposes protocol and show the usual statement of the
folk theorem that for a sufficiently high discount factor any individually rational outcome
is possible. Note that the BF model violates strict superadditivity when viewed as a
transferable utility game. Norman (2002) studies a finite horizon version of the BF model
and shows for the case with at least five players that any interior division of the surplus can
be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if players are sufficiently patient
and there are sufficiently many rounds of bargaining. He also shows indeterminacy of the
equilibrium outcome whenever there are at least three players and at least three bargaining
rounds.
The BF model with three players is a borderline case where the usual statement of
the folk theorem does not apply, but the set of subgame perfect equilibria can be sizable.
Recall that in the Rubinstein (1982) model with two players, there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. Cho and Duggan (2009) analyze a version of the BF model where an
arbitrary number of players bargains on a one–dimensional ideological spectrum of policies
and agents have single–peaked preferences over policies. Under sequential voting and some
mild assumptions on the order of voting, they find that only the median ideal alternative
can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Cho and Duggan (2013) demonstrate
that this result does not carry over to simultaneous and publicly observed voting, even
when voting is assumed to be stage–undominated and even obtain the support of arbitrary
outcomes for arbitrary positive discount factors.
For the BF model with three players, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for one period of delay before acceptance takes place. We characterize the threshold such
that, for any value of the discount factor greater than the threshold, one period of delay
is possible and for any value of the discount factor smaller than the threshold all subgame
perfect equilibria are characterized by immediate acceptance. We also demonstrate the
possibility of arbitrary long delay before acceptance takes place in a subgame perfect
equilibrium when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
For low values of the discount factors, the offers as observed in experiments are not
consistent with stationary equilibrium, and are not even consistent with subgame perfect
equilibrium. For instance, when the discount factor is equal to 1/2, Fre´chette, Kagel,
and Morelli (2005) find an average share of the proposer for accepted offers equal to 0.50,
lower than the lowest possible share of 0.78 in a subgame perfect equilibrium, which does
not differ much from the stationary equilibrium share of 0.83. For higher values of the
discount factor, the literature reports on experiments with discount factors equal to 0.9,
0.95, and 1, the experimental findings on accepted offers are not in contradiction with the
predictions of subgame perfect equilibrium. Regarding delay before reaching an agreement,
the experimental literature find little delay for experienced subjects when the discount
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factor is equal to 0.5, but substantial delay when the discount factor is equal to 0.9 or
higher. We find that the critical discount factor needed to have subgame perfect equilibria
with one–period delay is slightly above 0.8.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the BF model
and derive bounds on subgame perfect equilibrium utilities as a function of the discount
factor. In Section 3 we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium utilities conditional
on the selection of a proposer and argue that the bounds in Section 2 are tight. The explicit
construction of the subgame perfect equilibria that reach the bounds is relegated to the
appendix. In Section 4 we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the discount
factor for one period of delay before acceptance takes place. In Section 5 we investigate
the possibility of arbitrary long delay before acceptance takes place in a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
2 The bounds for subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs
We consider the three player version of the BF model. The set of players N = {1, 2, 3}
has to agree on the choice of a payoff vector in the set of feasible payoffs V = {x ∈ R3+,
x1+x2+x3 ≤ 1}. In each time period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . nature selects a proposer and the order
of the responders by means of time-invariant recognition probabilities. More precisely, in
the beginning of period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . nature selects each permutation πt : {1, 2, 3} → N in
the set of six possible permutations Π with equal probability. The choice of the permutation
is independent across time periods. Player πt(1) makes a proposal xt ∈ V . Next Player
πt(2) responds by accepting or rejecting the proposal. If πt(2) accepts the proposal, the
game ends, and the proposal xt is implemented. Otherwise, Player πt(3) reacts to the
proposal. If Player πt(3) accepts, the game ends. If Player πt(3) rejects the proposal,
period t+1 begins. The utility of player i ∈ N who receives outcome xi in period t is δtxi,
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the common discount factor. If no agreement is ever reached, payoffs
are 0.
A history h is the sequence of all actions that have occurred before a particular decision
node in the game. For simplicity we suppress the elements of the sequence pertaining to
the moves by the responding players: it is understood that in any non–terminal history
both responders have rejected all proposals to date. With this convention, for t = 0, 1, . . .
any non-terminal history is of one of the following two types:
1. h ∈ H t1 if and only if h is of the form (π0, x0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, πt),
2. h ∈ H t2 if and only if h is of the form (π0, x0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, πt, xt),
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where for every k ∈ {0, . . . , t}, πk is a permutation of N and xk ∈ V. After a history
h ∈ H t1, the proposer makes a move and, after a history h ∈ H t2, a responder accepts or
rejects the current proposal. Histories in H t1 are therefore called proposer histories and
those in H t2 responder histories.
A pure strategy for Player i ∈ N assigns to every history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt) ∈ H t1 with
πt(1) = i an element of V, and to every history h ∈ H t2 with πt(1) 6= i an accept/reject
decision. All our results make only use of pure strategy profiles. It is an easy exercise
to verify that the bounds we present on equilibrium utilities carry over to mixed strategy
profiles as well.
A strategy is stationary if it does not depend on payoff irrelevant parts of the history,
see Maskin and Tirole (2001) for a precise formulation of the notion of stationarity. For
the BF model, stationarity means that a player makes the same proposal at every history
in H t1 where he is recognized as a proposer and bases his accept/reject decisions only on
the current proposal and the identity of the player voting next to him in the current voting
round.
The following result follows from the analysis in Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
Theorem 2.1 For every δ ∈ [0, 1), a strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium in
stationary strategies if and only if it has the following form: (1) the recognized player offers
δ/3 to one responding player and keeps 1− δ/3 for himself; (2) a responding player accepts
any proposal in which he receives at least δ/3 and rejects otherwise; (3) all players receive
δ/3 as responding player with ex ante probability equal to 1/3.
In equilibrium, the recognized player forms a minimum winning coalition with one re-
sponding player, offers the responding player exactly his continuation utility, offers nothing
to the third player, and keeps the remainder of the surplus. The responding player who
is part of the minimum winning coalition accepts this proposal.1 The equilibrium in
Theorem 2.1 is not unique, since there is some indeterminacy in the selection by the
proposer of the player who joins the minimum winning coalition. However, all strategy
profiles described in Theorem 2.1 lead to the same equilibrium payoffs. Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) show that this result extends to the case with an odd number n of players, where
now δ(n− 1)/2n is offered to (n− 1)/2 players, 0 to the other players, and the remainder
is kept by the proposer. It follows from Eraslan (2002) that stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium payoffs are unique, also when mixed strategies are allowed for.
We now drop the stationarity assumption on strategies. The set of all subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) payoff vectors is denoted by U, a subset of V. For i ∈ N, let ui be the
1On top of stationarity, it is assumed in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) that whenever indifferent, a re-
sponder accepts a proposal.
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Figure 1: b and b as functions of δ.
supremum of SPE payoffs for Player i and ui be the infimum, so
ui = sup{ui ∈ R | u ∈ U},
ui = inf{ui ∈ R | u ∈ U}.
We define the real numbers b and b by
b =
3− 3δ
9− 6δ − δ2 , (2.1)
b =
3− δ
9− 6δ − δ2 . (2.2)
Figure 1 plots b and b as a function of δ. The following result characterizes the subgame
perfect equilibrium utilities as a function of the discount factor.
Theorem 2.2 It holds that u1 = u2 = u3 = b and u1 = u2 = u3 = b.
The proof of Theorem 2.2 consists of two parts. The first part, carried out in the
remainder of this section, consists of showing that in any SPE the payoff to any player is
bounded from below by b and from above by b, that is b ≤ ui and ui ≤ b. In the next
section we show that these bounds are tight: we explicitly construct an SPE where one
player receives a payoff of b and another player a payoff of b.
Due to the symmetry of the game it is clear that u1 = u2 = u3 and u1 = u2 = u3. We
henceforth write simply u instead of ui and u instead of ui.
The first claim puts an upperbound of 1 on the sum of u and u.
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Claim 2.3 It holds that u+ u ≤ 1.
Proof: Consider some u ∈ U. Since u ∈ V, it holds that u1 + u2 ≤ u1 + u2 + u3 ≤ 1, and
therefore u1 ≤ 1− u2. We have that
u = sup{u1 | u ∈ U} ≤ sup{1− u2 | u ∈ U} = 1− inf{u2 | u ∈ U} = 1− u.

Our next claim puts bounds on the behavior of responders in an SPE.
Claim 2.4 Consider the subgame following the period 0 proposer history h = (π). In any
SPE s it holds that
[1] A proposal x ∈ V by Player π(1) such that xπ(2) > δu or xπ(3) > δu is accepted by
Player π(2) or by Player π(3).
[2] A proposal x ∈ V by Player π(1) such that xπ(2) < δu and xπ(3) < δu is rejected by
both Players π(2) and π(3).
Proof: [1] Let x ∈ V be such that xi > δu for some i ∈ {π(2), π(3)}. Suppose that
according to the strategy profile s the proposal x is rejected both by Player π(2) and by
Player π(3). Consider the responder history (h, x). The payoff to Player i of the strategy
profile s at (h, x) is at most δu. On the other hand, accepting the proposal x yields Player i
a payoff of xi. Thus Player i has a profitable deviation at (h, x), leading to a contradiction.
[2] Let x ∈ V be such that xi < δu for both i ∈ {π(2), π(3)}. Consider Player π(3)’s
action at the responder history (h, x). Since accepting x yields a payoff of xπ(3) and re-
jecting x gives a payoff of at least δu, Player π(3) must reject. Consider now Player π(2)’s
action at (h, x). A rejection of x by Player π(2) is followed by the rejection of x by Player
π(3) and so yields Player π(2) a payoff of at least δu, whereas acceptance leads to a payoff
of only xπ(2). We conclude that Player π(2) must reject x. 
The statement in [1] of Claim 2.4 is subtle. It considers a proposal where one or both
responding players receive more than δu. The claim is that such a proposal is accepted,
but the statement does not specify by whom. Indeed, if both responding players receive
more than δu, then Player π(2) can safely reject such a proposal in the knowledge that
Player π(3) is going to accept it. Similarly, if the proposal is such that only Player π(3)
receives more than δu, it could still be that Player π(2) accepts it, since Player π(2) is
indifferent whether such a proposal is accepted by himself or by Player π(3).
The following claim derives bounds on SPE utilities conditional on the selection of the
proposer.
8
Claim 2.5 Consider the subgame following the period 0 proposer history h = (π) and let
v = (v1, v2, v3) be the payoffs of an SPE s conditional on the subgame being reached. It
holds that
[1] vπ(1) ≥ 1− δu,
[2] vπ(1) ≤ 1− δu,
[3] vπ(2) ≤ δu and vπ(3) ≤ δu.
Proof: [1] By Claim 2.4 the proposal x where xπ(1) = 1 − δu − ǫ, xπ(2) = δu + ǫ, and
xπ(3) = 0 is accepted for each ǫ > 0. Since s is an SPE we have vπ(1) ≥ 1− δu− ǫ for each
ǫ > 0. It follows that vπ(1) ≥ 1− δu.
[2] Let x be Player π(1)’s proposal at h under the strategy profile s. Suppose first
that x is rejected under s. Since this results in at least one period of delay, it follows that
vπ(1) ≤ δu. It follows from Claim 2.3 that δu ≤ 1 − δu and therefore that vπ(1) ≤ 1 − δu.
Suppose now x is accepted. Then by Claim 2.4 it is the case that xπ(2) ≥ δu or xπ(3) ≥ δu.
Therefore vπ(1) = xπ(1) ≤ 1− xπ(2) − xπ(3) ≤ 1− δu.
[3] We have vπ(2) ≤ 1− vπ(1) − vπ(3) ≤ 1− vπ(1) ≤ δu, where the last inequality follows
from [1]. The argument for vπ(3) is similar. 
The equilibrium utility conditional on being the initial proposer is in between 1 − δu
and 1 − δu. Responders have equilibrium utilities bounded from above by δu. The result
carries over to subgames in later periods t, except that discounting implies that all utilities
should be multiplied by δt.
We now use the claims derived so far to derive a lower bound on u in terms of δ and u,
and an upper bound on u in terms of δ and u.
Claim 2.6 It holds that
1− δu
3
≤ u ≤ u ≤ 1− δu
3 − 2δ .
Proof: Let s be an SPE with payoffs u ∈ U. For each permutation π ∈ Π, let vπ =
(vπ1 , v
π
2 , v
π
3 ) be the payoff of s conditional on nature choosing π as the initial permutation.
Since each permutation is equally likely, we have
u = 1
6
∑
π∈Π
vπ.
For a permutation π ∈ {(1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2)} it holds that Player 1 is the proposer. By
parts [1] and [2] of Claim 2.5 it holds that 1− δu ≤ vπ1 ≤ 1− δu.
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Next, consider a permutation π ∈ Π \ {(1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2)}. Now Player 1 is a responding
player and so 0 ≤ vπ1 ≤ δu by part [3] of Claim 2.5. We conclude that
2
6
(1− δu) + 4
6
0 ≤ u1 ≤ 26(1− δu) + 46δu.
Since the inequalities hold for every u ∈ U, we have
1
3
(1− δu) ≤ u ≤ u ≤ 1
3
(1− δu) + 2
3
δu.
Rearranging the last inequality yields the result. 
We are now in a position to prove the first half of Theorem 2.2. The payoff to any
player in any SPE of the game is bounded from below by b and from above by b.
Theorem 2.7 It holds that b ≤ u ≤ u ≤ b.
Proof: Define the functions f, g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by
f(y) =
1− δy
3
and g(y) =
1− δy
3− 2δ ,
and let h = g ◦ f . Then the function h is defined by
h(y) =
1− δ(1−δy
3
)
3− 2δ =
3− δ + δ2y
9− 6δ , y ∈ [0, 1].
By Claim 2.6, we have that
f(u) ≤ u ≤ u ≤ g(u).
Using the fact that g is a non-increasing function, we obtain u ≤ g(u) ≤ g(f(u)), and
hence u ≤ h(u). Since h is a non-decreasing function, we can iterate the last inequality to
obtain u ≤ hn(u).
It is easy to see that h is a contraction and that b is a fixed point of h. By the Banach
contraction theorem it follows that hn(u) converges to b, so we have shown that u ≤ b.
An easy computation shows that b = f(b). Since f is a non-increasing function, we
have that
b = f(b) ≤ f(u) ≤ u,
which completes the proof. 
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3 Explicit subgame perfect equilibria
In the previous section we have shown that SPE utilities are bounded from below by b and
from above by b. In this section we show that these bounds are tight by constructing an
SPE yielding Player 2 a payoff of b and Player 3 a payoff of b.
We define
V1 = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 1− δb and [v2 ≥ δb or v3 ≥ δb]},
V2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ 1− δb and [v3 ≥ δb or v1 ≥ δb]},
V3 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ 1− δb and [v1 ≥ δb or v2 ≥ δb]}.
For i ∈ N, the set Vi gives the payoffs that can be obtained as SPE utilities conditional on
reaching a subgame in Period 0 where Player i is selected as a proposer.
Theorem 3.1 Choose a1 ∈ V1, a2 ∈ V2, and a3 ∈ V3. Then there exists an SPE s such
that for each permutation π0 the proposal aπ0(1) is made and accepted in period 0.
The constructive proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in the appendix. Using Theorem
3.1, it is easy to complete the proof of Theorem 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 2.2: For i ∈ N, we choose elements ai ∈ Vi that are the best for
Player 2 and the worst for Player 3, so a1 = (1 − δb, δb, 0), a2 = (δb, 1 − δb, 0), and
a3 = (0, δb, 1− δb). Now let s be a strategy profile that satisfies the conditions of Theorem
3.1. Since
b =
1
3
(1− δb), (3.1)
b =
1
3
(1− δb) + 2
3
δb, (3.2)
we find that the strategy profile s yields a payoff of b for Player 2 and a payoff of b for
Player 3. 
In any SPE in stationary strategies, the proposer obtains a payoff of 1−δ/3 in period 0 and
one of the responders receives a payoff of δ/3. The stationary equilibrium is usually taken
as a theoretical benchmark in the experimental literature. In this literature, substantial
deviations from this benchmark are found. McKelvey (1991) describes an experiment with
a discrete version of the BF model. Compared to the stationary prediction, proposers
usually offer too much to the responding players. Diermeier and Morton (2006) consider
a finitely repeated version of the BF model. Similar to McKelvey (1991), Diermeier and
Morton (2006) find little support for the predictions of the stationary equilibrium. First, in
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one third of the cases a positive amount was proposed to all players, not just to the members
of the minimal winning coalition. Moreover, proposers consistently offer too much to other
coalition members. Both McKelvey (1991) and Diermeier and Morton (2006) report the
use of non–stationary strategies. We verify to what extent the findings in the experimental
literature are consistent with the non–stationary subgame perfect equilibria as found in
Theorem 3.1. We refer to the responder who is offered the higher share in the cake as
Player j, and to the other responder as Player k.
Fre´chette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005) provide experimental evidence for the under-
realization of proposer power and the generosity shown to voters outside the minimal
winning coalition for the BF model with δ = 0.5 and δ = 1. They consider both treatments
with experienced and treatments with inexperienced players.
When δ = 1, 39% of the proposals for inexperienced players do not correspond to
the formation of a minimum winning coalition, a number that is still equal to 23% for
experienced players. Even perfectly egalitarian proposals are observed in more than 5% of
the cases. A perfectly egalitarian proposal is consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium
when 1 − δb ≤ 1/3, which is equivalent to δ ≥ (21 − 3√41)/2 ≈ 0.895. The average
share of the proposer for accepted offers is 0.51 for inexperienced players and 0.52 for
experienced players, considerably lower than the stationary equilibrium prediction of 0.67.
The average share of Player j is 0.43 for inexperienced players and 0.45 for experienced
players, considerably more than the stationary equilibrium prediction of 0.33. Since we
have shown that any proposal and any payoff is possible in an SPE for discount factors
tending to one, these results would not contradict SPE.
When δ = 0.5, 57% of the proposals for inexperienced players do not correspond to the
formation of a minimum winning coalition, a number that is still equal to 23% for experi-
enced players. The average share of the proposer for accepted offers is 0.50 for inexperienced
players and 0.59 for experienced players, considerably lower than the stationary equilibrium
prediction of 0.83. The average share of Player j is 0.41 for inexperienced players and 0.39
for experienced players, considerably more than the stationary equilibrium prediction of
0.17. Our results predict a payoff to the proposer in the range from 1 − δb = 0.78 to
1− δb = 0.87. The payoff to the player who receives the higher share is predicted to be in
the range from δb = 0.13 to δb = 0.22. The payoff to the player who receives the lower share
is predicted to be in the range from 0 to δb/2 = 0.11. For δ = 0.5 the experimental findings
are not even consistent with SPE. This is not so surprising, since for such low values of the
discount factor, the potential influence of punishment is quite limited. Fre´chette, Kagel,
and Morelli (2005) offer the reluctance of coalition partners to accept offers much below
1/3 as an explanation of these findings.
Kagel, Sung, and Winter (2010) consider a treatment corresponding to the BF model
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with a discount factor δ = 0.95. They report that 40.8% of the proposals do not correspond
to the formation of a minimum winning coalition. For accepted offers, the average share of
the proposer is 0.458 and for Player j it is 0.44. Very similar results are found in Breitmoser
and Tan (2010), who also study the case δ = 0.95. The sample estimates are 0.445 to the
proposer, 0.359 to Player j, and 0.172 to Player k. The stationary equilibrium predicts a
payoff of 0.683 to the proposer, 0.317 to Player j, and 0 to Player k. Our results predict a
payoff to the proposer in the range from 1 − δb = 0.188 to 1 − δb = 0.938. The payoff to
the player who receives the higher share is predicted to be in the range from δb = 0.063 to
δb = 0.813. The payoff to the player who receives the lower share is predicted to be in the
range from 0 to δb = 0.406.
Miller and Vanberg (2013) compare the costs of reaching agreement under majority
and unanimity rule in the context of an experimental bargaining game with δ = 0.9. They
find patterns very similar to those reported in the previous literature. Proposers demand
a higher share than they allocate to non-proposers, but the difference is far from the equi-
librium prediction. Interestingly, approximately half of the proposals in the first period
are three-way equal splits and only one out of five allocates 0 to one of the non-proposers.
We have shown that three-way equal splits are SPE payoffs for δ ≥ 0.84.
4 Equilibria with one–period delay
The experimental literature shows that one cannot rule out delay before acceptance takes
place. Fre´chette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005) conclude that a majority of the proposals are
accepted without delay, however, delays persist until the end of the sessions. They find
one or more rounds of delay for experienced subjects in 5% of the cases when δ = 0.5, a
number increasing to 23% when δ = 1. For inexperienced subjects, one or more rounds of
delay occur in 11% of the cases when δ = 0.5 and in 32% of the cases when δ = 1. Kagel,
Sung, and Winter (2010) report one or more rounds of delay in 28% of the cases when
δ = 0.95. Miller and Vanberg (2013) consider the case where δ = 0.9 and find one or more
rounds of delay before acceptance takes place in 25% of the cases.
In this section we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to have exactly one
period of delay before acceptance takes place in an SPE. A strategy profile s is said to
have one–period delay if, irrespectively of the moves of nature, the proposal in period 0
is rejected by both responders, and the proposal in period 1 is accepted by at least one
responder. More precisely, the strategy profile s has one–period delay if for all permutations
π0 and π1 the proposal sπ0(1)(π
0) is rejected by both Players π0(2) and π0(3), while the
proposal sπ1(1)(π
0, sπ0(1)(π
0), π1) is accepted by π1(2) or π1(3).
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Theorem 4.1 There exists an SPE with one–period delay if and only if δ ≥ 6 − 3√3 ≈
0.804.
The condition δ ≥ 6− 3√3 is derived from the inequality 1− δb ≤ δb, which expresses
that the minimum equilibrium payoff conditional on being the proposer should be less than
or equal to the discounted maximum unconditional equilibrium payoff. We first prove the
only if part of Theorem 4.1.
Claim 4.2 If there is an SPE with one–period delay, then δ ≥ 6− 3√3.
Proof: Let s be an SPE with one–period delay. Without loss of generality, assume that
π0 = (1, 2, 3). Conditional on π0, the payoff to Player 1 is at most δu. On the other hand,
for each ǫ > 0, the proposal (1− δu − ǫ, δu+ ǫ, 0) is accepted by Claim 2.4. Since s is an
SPE, we must have 1− δu− ǫ ≤ δu for each ǫ > 0, and hence 1− δu ≤ δu. Since u = b by
Theorem 2.2, we find 1− δb ≤ δb, so
1− 3δ − δ
2
9δ − 6δ2 − δ3 ≤
3δ − δ2
9δ − 6δ2 − δ3 .
Rearranging terms, we find that δ ≥ 6− 3√3. 
To prove the if part of Theorem 4.1, we construct an SPE ŝ such that on the equilibrium
path of play the proposer π0(1) in period 0 demands the entire surplus, his proposal is
rejected, and the proposal in period 1 by Player π1(1) is accepted leading to an expected
payoff of δb to Player π0(1). Any deviation by Player π0(1) results in a payoff of at most
1− δb. Under the assumption that 1− δb ≤ δb such a deviation is not profitable.
Let τ 1 be the SPE constructed in Theorem 3.1 with a1 = (1 − δb, δb, 0), a2 = (δb, 1 −
δb, 0), and a3 = (δb, 0, 1− δb). Strategy profile τ 1 gives an expected payoff of b to Player
1. Similarly, let τ 2 be the SPE provided by Theorem 3.1 with a1 = (1 − δb, δb, 0), a2 =
(0, 1 − δb, δb), and a3 = (0, δb, 1 − δb), and let τ 3 be the SPE with a1 = (1 − δb, 0, δb),
a2 = (0, 1− δb, δb), and a3 = (0, δb, 1− δb). Strategy profile τ 2 gives an expected payoff of
b to Player 2 and τ 3 gives an expected payoff of b to Player 3.
Let γ be the SPE delivered by Theorem 3.1 with a1 = (1−δb, δb, 0), a2 = (0, 1−δb, δb),
and a3 = (δb, 0, 1− δb). The payoffs corresponding to γ are (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
The one–period delay strategy profile ŝ is defined by means of the strategy profiles
τ 1, τ 2, τ 3, and γ. The initial proposer π0(1) proposes to keep the entire surplus, so proposes
the unit vector eπ0(1), a proposal which is rejected. For histories where the initial proposer
has deviated, ŝ is defined to be equal to γ. Otherwise, starting in period 1, ŝ is defined to
be equal to τπ
0(1), where the period 0 history is deleted before applying τπ
0(1). Whomever
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is the initial proposer in Period 0 is maximally rewarded in Period 1. More precisely, we
have the following definitions.
For period t = 0, we define
ŝπ0(1)(π
0) = eπ0(1),
ŝπ0(2)(π
0, eπ0(1)) = ŝπ0(3)(π
0, eπ0(1)) = r,
ŝπ0(2)(π
0, x0) = γπ0(2)(π
0, x0), if x0 6= eπ0(1),
ŝπ0(3)(π
0, x0) = γπ0(3)(π
0, x0), if x0 6= eπ0(1).
When the proposal eπ0(1) is made in period 0, we define ŝ for histories in period t ≥ 1 by
ŝπt(1)(π
0, eπ0(1), π
1, x1, . . . , πt) = τ
π0(1)
πt(1) (π
1, x1, . . . , πt),
ŝπt(2)(π
0, eπ0(1), π
1, x1, . . . , πt, xt) = τ
π0(1)
πt(2) (π
1, x1 . . . , πt, xt),
ŝπt(3)(π
0, eπ0(1), π
1, x1, . . . , πt, xt) = τ
π0(1)
πt(3) (π
1, x1 . . . , πt, xt).
When the proposal x0 made in period 0 is not equal to eπ0(1), we define ŝ for histories in
period t ≥ 1 by
ŝπt(1)(π
0, x0, . . . , πt) = γπt(1)(π
0, x0, . . . , πt),
ŝπt(2)(π
0, x0, . . . , πt, xt) = γπt(2)(π
0, x0, . . . , πt, xt),
ŝπt(3)(π
0, x0, . . . , πt, xt) = γπt(3)(π
0, x0, . . . , πt, xt).
Let ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , t}. For a history h in period t we define “the tail” h−ℓ of h obtained
by deleting the first ℓ periods from h. More precisely, for h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt) we define
h−ℓ = (πℓ, xℓ, . . . , πt), and for h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt) we define h−ℓ = (πℓ, xℓ, . . . , πt, xt). In
particular h−0 = h.
The claim below makes an almost trivial observation: Assume that the strategy profile
s is an SPE of Γ. Assume furthermore that the strategy profile ŝ is such that, as soon
as some given history h in period ℓ has been reached, the strategy profile ŝ is equal to s,
where s is applied after deleting the first ℓ periods from the history. Then ŝ is subgame
perfect in the subgame starting at h. For a history h ∈ H, we denote the player who acts
at h by ι(h). For history h, h′, we write h ≥ h′ if h = h′ or the history h extends the history
h′.
Claim 4.3 Let s be an SPE of Γ and let h′ be a history in period ℓ. Let the strategy profile
ŝ be such that ŝι(h)(h) = sι(h)(h
−ℓ) for each history h ≥ h′. Then ŝ is subgame perfect in
the subgame starting at h′.
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Proof: The subgame starting at history h is isomorphic to the one starting at h−ℓ. Hence,
if there would be a profitable one–shot deviation from ŝ at h, there would be one from s
at h−ℓ. 
As it is clear that ŝ is a strategy profile with one–period delay, the if part of Theorem 4.1
follows immediately from the following claim.
Claim 4.4 If δ ≥ 6− 3√3, then ŝ is an SPE.
Proof: Consider the proposer history (π0). Under the strategy profile ŝ, Player π0(1)
makes the proposal eπ0(1), a proposal that is followed by a rejection, and the acceptance
of the proposal ŝπ1(1)(π
0, eπ0(1), π
1) next period, leading to an expected payoff of δb to
Player π0(1). We argue that Player π0(1) does not have a profitable one–shot deviation
from ŝπ0(1) at (π
0). Consider a one–shot deviation to x0 6= eπ0(1) by Player π0(1). For
histories h ≥ (π0, x0), it holds that ŝι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h).
At history (π0), the strategy profile γ requires that the proposal γπ0(1)(π
0) is made and
accepted, which gives Player π0(1) a utility equal to 1 − δb. Since γ is subgame perfect,
Player π0(1) does not have a profitable one–shot deviation from γ, so under γ, the expected
payoff of Player π0(1) following any proposal y is less than or equal to 1 − δb. Since for
histories h ≥ (π0, x0), it holds that ŝι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h), we find that under ŝ, a one–shot
deviation to x0 6= eπ0(1) by Player π0(1) gives him an expected payoff less than or equal to
1− δb. Since δ ≥ 6− 3√3, we have that 1− δb ≤ δb, so the one–shot deviation to x0 is not
profitable.
Consider the responder history (π0, eπ0(1)). According to ŝ, both responders reject the
proposal eπ0(1). Accepting the proposal gives a responder a payoff equal to 0 and is clearly
not a profitable deviation from ŝ.
For all other histories, the one–shot deviation property follows from Claim 4.3. Indeed,
consider x0 6= eπ0(1). For histories h ≥ (π0, x0), the one–shot deviation property follows
from Claim 4.3 with h0 = (π
0, x0), ℓ = 0, and s = γ. For histories h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1), π1), the
one–shot deviation property follows from Claim 4.3 with h0 = (π
0, eπ0(1), π
1), ℓ = 1, and
s = τπ
0(1). 
5 Arbitrarily long delay
In this section we show that any finite delay is compatible with an SPE, provided that the
players are patient enough. By analogy with the case of one–period delay, we say that the
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strategy profile s has m–period delay if, irrespective of the moves by nature, the proposals
in periods 0, . . . , m− 1 are rejected, and the proposal in period m is accepted.
Theorem 5.1 Consider any m ≥ 1. Then there exists a strategy profile s˜ with m–period
delay and a discount factor δ˜ < 1 such that s˜ is an SPE whenever δ ≥ δ˜.
We let δ˜ be the unique value of δ that solves the equation
δm
3
= 1− δ 3− δ
9− 6δ − δ2 .
Notice that the right–hand side of this equation is exactly 1 − δb. This is a decreasing
function of δ with value 1 at δ = 0 and value 0 at δ = 1. Hence the solution exists and is
unique. Moreover, for each δ > δ˜ it holds that δm/3 > 1− δb.
Since
0 = δ˜m+2 + 6δ˜m+1 − 9δ˜m − 27δ˜ + 27 ≤ δ˜m + 6δ˜m − 9δ˜m − 27δ˜m + 27 = −29δ˜m + 27,
it follows that δ˜ ≤ (27/29)1/m.
For δ ≥ δ˜, the vector (δm/3, δm/3, δm/3) belongs to the sets V1, V2, and V3, since
δm/3 ≥ 1− δb and 1− δb ≥ δb. We let γ be the strategy profile provided by Theorem 3.1
with a1 = a2 = a3 = (δ
m/3, δm/3, δm/3). The vector (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) also belongs to
the sets V1, V2, and V3. Let τ be the strategy profile provided by Theorem 3.1 with
a1 = a2 = a3 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
We construct a strategy profile s˜ such that on the equilibrium path of play in periods
0, . . . , m− 1 the proposers demand the entire surplus and their proposals are rejected. If
period m is reached without deviations, the history of the preceding periods is deleted and
as of period m the strategy profile τ is followed. In particular, on the equilibrium path of
play, the equal split is proposed and accepted in period m. However, as soon as a proposer
deviates in some period ℓ < m, the history of the preceding periods is deleted, and the
strategy profile γ is followed.
We partition the setH of histories into pairwise disjoint setsD−1, D0, . . . , Dm as follows:
D−1 = {h ∈ H | (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πm−1, eπm−1(1)) ≥ h},
for 0 ≤ ℓ < m,
Dℓ =
{
h ∈ H | ∃xℓ ∈ V \ {eπℓ(1)} such that h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), πℓ, xℓ)
}
,
and
Dm =
{
h ∈ H | h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πm−1, eπm−1(1), πm)} .
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We define the strategy profile s˜ as follows:
s˜πℓ(1)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
ℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), π
ℓ) = eπℓ(1), 0 ≤ ℓ < m, (5.1)
s˜πℓ(2)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
ℓ, eπℓ(1)) = r, 0 ≤ ℓ < m, (5.2)
s˜πℓ(3)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
ℓ, eπℓ(1)) = r, 0 ≤ ℓ < m, (5.3)
s˜ι(h)(h) = τι(h)(h
−m), h ∈ Dm, (5.4)
s˜ι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h
−ℓ), h ∈ Dℓ, 0 ≤ ℓ < m. (5.5)
Equations (5.1)–(5.3) specify s˜ on the set of histories D−1, Equation (5.4) on Dm, and
Equation (5.5) on Dℓ for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , m− 1}.
From Equation (5.4) we get
s˜πm(1)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
m−1, eπm−1(1), π
m) = τπm(1)(π
m) =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
, (5.6)
s˜πm(2)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
m−1, eπm−1(1), π
m,
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
) = τπm(2)
(
πm,
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
))
= a, (5.7)
s˜πm(3)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
m−1, eπm−1(1), π
m,
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
) = τπm(3)
(
πm,
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
))
= a. (5.8)
Equations (5.1)–(5.3) and (5.6)–(5.8) specify the equilibrium path of play under s˜: The
proposals eπ0(1), . . . , eπm−1(1) are made and rejected, followed by the proposal (1/3, 1/3, 1/3),
which is accepted. Thus the strategy profile s˜ has m–period delay. All players receive a
payoff of δm/3. Equation (5.4) specifies the play of the game as of period m, provided that
no deviations have occurred before period m. Equation (5.5) specifies the continuation play
following a deviation in period ℓ < m.
In case m = 1, the construction above resembles that in the previous section. One
difference is that here the play following histories of the form (π0, eπ0(1), π
1) as defined by
Equation (5.4) is independent of the permutation π0, whereas in the preceding section it
does depend on π0(1).
Claim 5.2 If δ ≥ δ˜, then s˜ is an SPE with m–period delay.
Proof: We show that there are no profitable one–shot deviations from s˜.
For some ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , m−1}, consider the proposer history (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), πℓ).
Under the strategy profile s˜, Player πℓ(1) receives a payoff of δm/3. Consider a one–shot de-
viation to xℓ 6= eπℓ(1) by Player πℓ(1). For histories h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), πℓ, xℓ),
it holds that s˜ι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h
−ℓ).
At history (πℓ), the strategy profile γ requires that the proposal (δm/3, δm/3, δm/3)
is made and accepted. Since γ is subgame perfect for δ ≥ δ˜, Player πℓ(1) does not
have a profitable one-shot deviation from γ, so under γ, the expected payoff of Player
πℓ(1) following any proposal y is less than or equal to δm/3. Since for histories h ≥
(π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
ℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), π
ℓ, xℓ), it holds that s˜ι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h
−ℓ), we find that under s˜,
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a one–shot deviation to xℓ 6= eπℓ(1) by Player πℓ(1) gives him an expected payoff less than
or equal to δℓδm/3. The one-shot deviation is therefore not profitable.
For some ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , m−1}, consider the responder history h = (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πℓ, eπℓ(1)).
According to s˜, both responders reject the proposal eπℓ(1). Accepting the proposal gives a
responder a payoff equal to 0 and is clearly not a profitable deviation from s˜.
For histories in D0, . . . , Dm, the one–shot deviation property follows by an application
of Claim 4.3. 
6 Conclusion
In this paper we consider the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model, where three players use
majority voting to divide a surplus in the presence of discounting. We give a complete
characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any value of the
discount factor. Although the usual statement of the folk theorem does not hold in this
setting, we show that any given vector in the interior of the set of feasible payoffs is a
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for a sufficiently high value of the discount factor.
Many papers in the experimental literature use the subgame perfect equilibrium in
stationary strategies as a benchmark and conclude that this equilibrium is not supported by
the data. The experimental findings are however not in contradiction to the predictions of
subgame perfect equilibrium once the stationarity assumption is dropped and the discount
factor is sufficiently high. Experimental evidence for a discount factor as low as 1/2 cannot
be explained by non–stationary subgame perfect equilibria. Experimental papers also find
significant amounts of delay before an acceptance takes place, where the delay probability
increases with the discount factor. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the
discount factor to have one period of delay, and we construct subgame perfect equilibria
where arbitrary long delay occurs whenever the discount factor is sufficiently high.
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Appendix: The proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1 is proven separately in two subsections for the case δ ≤ 3/5 and for the case
δ > 3/5. In both cases the strategy profile s is constructed along the same lines.
We introduce some additional notation. Consider a responder history (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt).
We denote the proposer πt(1) in period t by pt. The responders in period t are denoted by
jt and kt, respectively, where jt is chosen such that his share in the cake weakly exceeds
that of player kt, and jt = πt(2) in case both shares are equal, so
jt =
{
πt(2), if [xtπt(2) ≥ xtπt(3)],
πt(3), if [xtπt(3) > x
t
πt(2)].
To avoid excessive notation, we write xtj and x
t
k instead of x
t
jt and x
t
kt , respectively. A
proposer history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt, πt+1) uniquely defines the finite sequence
h∗ = (p0, x0, j0, k0, . . . , pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1).
We define the strategy for the proposer using sequences of this form, leading to functions
ρ0, ρ1, . . .. These functions are defined recursively as follows. Set ρ0(p0) = ap0 and for each
t ≥ 0 let
ρt+1(p0, . . . , pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1) = f(pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1, ρt(p0, . . . , pt)),
where each of the subsections below uses a particular specification for the function f. With
a minor abuse of notation we write ρt(h) rather than ρt(h∗).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 for δ ≤ 3/5
Throughout this subsection it is assumed that δ ≤ 3/5. The function f is defined in
Table 1 and Table 2. If after the proposer history h in period t the proposer complies
with his strategy and makes a proposal xt = ρt(h), then the proposals in period t + 1 are
determined by Table 1. If the proposer deviates from his strategy and makes a proposal
xt 6= ρt(h), then the proposals in period t + 1 are determined by Table 2. The first three
columns of the tables list the six possible values for (pt, jt, kt), and the last three columns
specify f(pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1, yt) for each of the three possible values of pt+1.
We define the strategy profile s as follows:
1. For each t ≥ 0, for each history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt), Player pt proposes ρt(h).
2. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt), Player jt accepts xt if
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pt jt kt pt+1 = 1 pt+1 = 2 pt+1 = 3
1 2 3 (1− δb, 0, δb) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
1 3 2 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
2 1 3 (1− δb, δb, 0) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
2 3 1 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (0, δb, 1− δb)
3 1 2 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
3 2 1 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
Table 1: f(pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1, xt).
pt jt kt pt+1 = 1 pt+1 = 2 pt+1 = 3
1 2 3 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (0, δb, 1− δb)
1 3 2 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
2 1 3 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
2 3 1 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
3 1 2 (1− δb, 0, δb) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
3 2 1 (1− δb, δb, 0) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
Table 2: f(pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1, yt) if xt 6= yt.
• xt = ρt(h) or
• xtj ≥ δb,
and rejects otherwise.
3. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt), Player kt accepts xt if
• [xt = ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3 + δb] or
• [xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb],
and rejects otherwise.
Figure 2 shows some key thresholds as a function of δ.
The intuition behind strategy profile s is as follows. Table 1 determines ρt+1(h) after
a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , xt, πt+1) such that xt = ρt(π0, x0, . . . , πt). In other words, it
describes the proposal to be made after the equilibrium proposal was made and rejected
in the previous period. According to Table 1, in period t + 1 Player pt obtains the best
possible expected outcome, 1
3
(1 − δb) + 2
3
δb = b, as an encouragement for making the
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Figure 2: Key thresholds as a function of δ.
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proposal described by s in the previous period; Player jt obtains the worst possible expected
outcome, 1
3
(1−δb) = b, as a punishment for rejecting the proposal described by the strategy
profile; Player kt receives the remainder, which is equal to b+ δb/3.
Table 2 determines ρt+1(h) after a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , xt, πt+1) such that xt 6=
ρt(π0, x0, . . . , πt). In other words, it describes the proposal to be made after a deviation by
the proposer in the previous period. According to Table 2, Player pt obtains an expected
outcome of b+δb/3, as a punishment for deviating in the previous period. Player jt obtains
the best possible expected outcome of b, as an encouragement for rejecting a proposal that
was not described by the strategy profile. Player kt receives the remainder, which is equal
to b in expected terms.
The proof that the strategy profile s defined above is an SPE proceeds by verifying that
the one-shot deviation principle is satisfied. It is well-known that the one-shot deviation
principle gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for a stategy profile to be an SPE,
see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). The proof is divided into five steps. Claim A.1 states
that s has the “no delay property”, Claim A.2 shows that after any responder history
h the responder who receives the lower share has no profitable one-shot deviation from
s at h. Claim A.3 show that after any responder history h the responder who receives
the higher share has no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h. Claim A.4 show that
proposals xt 6= ρt(h) which give to the proposer more than 1 − δb are rejected by both
responders. And finally, Claim A.5 shows that after any proposer history h the proposer
has no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Claim A.1 The strategy profile s has the following no delay property: if after a history
h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt) the players play according to the strategy profile s, then ρt(h) is proposed
and accepted by one of the responders and the game ends.
Proof: The claim is immediate from the definition of s. Indeed, the proposer proposes
xt = ρt(h), which is accepted by Player jt. 
We now turn to the absence of profitable deviations by the player who receives the
smaller share.
Claim A.2 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt). Player kt has no profitable one-shot
deviation from s at h.
Proof: According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts xt if [xt = ρt(h) and xtk ≥
δ2b/3 + δb] or [xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb], and rejects otherwise. We consider four cases:
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1. xt = ρt(h) and xtk < δ
2b/3 + δb,
2. xt = ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3 + δb,
3. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk < δb,
4. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb.
The behavior of Player kt is irrelevant if Player jt responds after Player kt and accepts.
So in the following we only need to consider the case where Player jt moves before Player
kt or Player jt moves after Player kt and rejects.
Case 1. xt = ρt(h) and xtk < δ
2b/3 + δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the proposal, which leads to an
expected payoff of δt+1(δb/3 + (1 − δb)/3) = δt+1(δb/3 + b) = δt(δ2b/3 + δb). If Player kt
deviates and accepts, this gives him a payoff less than δt(δ2b/3+ δb). So acceptance is not
a profitable deviation.
Case 2. xt = ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3 + δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts the proposal, which leads to a
payoff of at least δt(δ2b/3 + δb). If Player kt deviates and rejects, the expected payoff is
δt(δ2b/3 + δb). So rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Case 3. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk < δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the proposal, leading to an ex-
pected payoff of δt+1(1 − δb)/3 = δt+1b. If Player kt deviates and accepts, it leads to a
payoff less than δt+1b. So acceptance is not a profitable deviation.
Case 4. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts the proposal, which leads to a
payoff of at least δt+1b. If Player kt deviates and rejects, the expected payoff is δt+1b. So
rejection is not a profitable deviation. 
We now turn to the absence of profitable deviations by the player who receives the
higher share.
Claim A.3 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt). Player jt has no profitable one–shot
deviation from s at h.
Proof: According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts xt if [xt = ρt(h)] or [xtj ≥ δb],
and rejects otherwise. We consider three cases:
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1. xt = ρt(h),
2. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtj ≥ δb,
3. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtj < δb.
The behavior of Player jt is irrelevant if Player kt responds after Player jt and accepts. So
in the following we only need to consider the case where Player kt moves before Player jt
or Player kt moves after Player jt and rejects.
Case 1. xt = ρt(h).
Note that if xt = ρt(h), then xtj ≥ δb. Indeed, if xt = a,then xtj ≥ δb. Moreover,
any proposal described by Tables 1 and 2 satisfies xtj = δb or x
t
j = δb. According to the
strategy profile s, Player jt accepts, which leads to a payoff of δtxtj ≥ δt+1b. If Player jt
rejects xt, this leads to an expected payoff of δt+1(1− δb)/3 = δt+1b. So rejection is not a
profitable deviation.
Case 2. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtj ≥ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts, which leads to a payoff of at
least δt+1b. If Player jt deviates and rejects xt, this leads to an expected payoff of
δt+1((1− δb)/3 + 2δb/3) = δt+1b. So rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Case 3. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtj < δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects, which leads to an expected payoff
of δt+1((1− δb)/3 + 2δb/3) = δt+1b. If Player jt deviates and accepts, he receives a payoff
less than or equal to δt+1b. So acceptance is not a profitable deviation. 
We have checked that responders have no profitable one-shot deviations. We now turn
our attention to the proposer. The following claim states that whenever a proposer deviates
from s and demands a share larger than 1− δb, the proposal will be rejected.
Claim A.4 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt). A proposal xt 6= ρt(h) such that xtpt >
1− δb is rejected by both responders.
Proof: Note that xtj + x
t
k < δb. Since by definition Player k
t is the responder who is
offered the smaller share, we have xtk < δb/2. Moreover, the assumption δ ≤ 3/5 implies
δb/2 ≤ δb, thus xtk < δb. It follows by the definition of s that Player kt rejects the proposal
xt. Player jt rejects the proposal xt since xtj < δb. 
The next claim states that a proposer does not have a profitable one-shot deviation.
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Claim A.5 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt). Player pt has no profitable one-shot
deviation from s at h.
Proof: If ρt(h) = a, then atpt ≥ 1− δb. Moreover, any proposal x described in both Tables
1 and 2 satisfies xpt = 1−δb or xpt = 1−δb. Since the proposal ρt(h) is accepted, it follows
that following s leads to a payoff greater than or equal to δt(1− δb) for Player pt.
If Player pt proposes xt 6= ρt(h) such that xtpt > 1 − δb, then the proposal is rejected
by Claim A.4 and the expected payoff for Player pt is equal to δt+1((1 − δb)/3 + δb/3) ≤
δt(1− δb).
If Player pt proposes xt 6= ρt(h) such that xtpt ≤ 1 − δb, then the proposal is either
accepted and leads to a payoff of δtxtpt ≤ δt(1 − δb), or rejected and leads to an expected
payoff of δt+1((1− δb)/3 + δb/3) ≤ δt(1− δb). In both cases, the payoff of Player pt is less
than or equal to δt(1− δb). 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 for δ > 3/5
Throughout this subsection it is assumed that δ > 3/5. The proof of the previous sub-
section breaks down, since Claim A.4 is no longer true. If δ > 3/5, it is no longer guar-
anteed that a proposal xt 6= ρt(h) such that xtpt > 1− δb is rejected by responder kt, since
it is not necessarily the case that xtk ≤ δb. We therefore change the construction of the
strategy profile s and replace Table 2 by Table 3. As before Table 1 gives the values for
f(pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1, yt) when xt = yt and Table 3 when xt 6= yt. For xtk ∈ [0, 1/2], θ(xtk)
measures the excess of xtk over δb when δb < x
t
k < δb/2 and is equal to zero otherwise.
Notice that when δ > 3/5, it holds that b < b/2. More precisely, θ(xtk) is defined by
θ(xtk) =
xtk/δ − b, if δb < xtk < δb/2,0, otherwise. (A.1)
If θ(xtk) = 0, then Table 3 is identical to Table 2. In case θ(x
t
k) 6= 0, Player jt obtains
an expected payoff of b− θ(xtk). Player jt is still rewarded for rejecting a proposal that was
not described by the strategy profile, but he shares a part of the reward with Player kt,
who receives the remainder xtk/δ. This makes Player k
t indifferent between accepting and
rejecting xtk.
We define the strategy profile s as follows:
1. For each t ≥ 0, for each history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt), Player pt proposes ρt(h).
2. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt), Player jt accepts xt if
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pt jt kt pt+1 = 1 pt+1 = 2 pt+1 = 3
1 2 3 (1− δb, δb− θ, θ) (δb, 1− δb− θ, θ) (0, δb− θ, 1− δb+ θ)
1 3 2 (1− δb, θ, δb− θ) (0, 1− δb+ θ, δb− θ) (δb, θ, 1− δb− θ)
2 1 3 (1− δb− θ, δb, θ) (δb− θ, 1− δb, θ) (δb− θ, 0, 1− δb+ θ)
2 3 1 (1− δb+ θ, 0, δb− θ) (θ, 1− δb, δb− θ) (θ, δb, 1− δb− θ)
3 1 2 (1− δb− θ, θ, δb) (δb− θ, 1− δb+ θ, 0) (δb− θ, θ, 1− δb)
3 2 1 (1− δb+ θ, δb− θ, 0) (θ, 1− δb− θ, δb) (θ, δb− θ, 1− δb)
Table 3: f(pt, xt, jt, kt, pt+1, yt), where xt 6= yt and θ = θ(xtk).
• [xt = ρt(h)] or
• [xtk ≤ δb and xtj ≥ δb] or
• [δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk] or
• [xtk ≥ δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb],
and rejects otherwise.
3. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt), Player kt accepts xt if
• [xt = ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3 + δb] or
• [xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb/2],
and rejects otherwise.
The proof of the fact that the strategy profile s described above is an SPE is divided
into six steps, five of which are the same as in the proof for δ ≤ 3/5.We need one additional
step to provide a bound on θ(xtk).
Claim A.6 states that s has the “no delay property.”
Claim A.6 The strategy profile s has the following no delay property: if after a history
h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt) the players play according to the strategy profile s, then ρt(h) is proposed
and accepted by one of the responders and the game ends.
Proof: The claim is immediate from the definition of s. Indeed, the proposer proposes
xt = ρt(h), which is accepted by Player jt. 
Claim A.7 shows that, after any responder history h, the responder with the smaller
share, kt, has no profitable one-shot deviations from s at h.
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Claim A.7 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt). Player kt has no profitable one-shot
deviation from s at h.
Proof: According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts xt if [xt = ρt(h) and xtk ≥
δ2b/3 + δb] or [xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb/2], and rejects otherwise. We consider five cases:
1. xt = ρt(h) and xtk < δ
2b/3 + δb - the proof is the same as in Claim A.2,
2. xt = ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3 + δb - the proof is the same as in Claim A.2,
3. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≤ δb - the proof is the same as in Claim A.2,
4. xt 6= ρt(h) and δb < xtk < δb/2,
5. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb/2.
The behavior of Player kt is irrelevant if Player jt responds after Player kt and accepts.
So in the following we only need to consider the case where Player jt moves before Player
kt or Player jt moves after Player kt and rejects.
Case 4. xt 6= ρt(h) and δb < xtk < δb/2.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the proposal. Recalling that
θ(xtk) = x
t
k/δ − b and using Equation (3.1), the resulting expected payoff is equal to
δt+1
(
1
3
(1− δb+ θ(xtk)) + 13θ(xtk) + 13θ(xtk)
)
= δt+1
(
1
3
(1− δb) + θ(xtk)
)
= δt+1(b + θ(xtk)) =
δtxtk. If Player k
t deviates and accepts, he obtains a payoff of δtxtk. So acceptance is not a
profitable deviation.
Case 5. xt 6= ρt(h) and xtk ≥ δb/2.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts the proposal, which leads to a
payoff of at least δtδb/2. If Player kt deviates and rejects, he obtains an expected payoff
of δt+1((1− δb)/3) = δt+1b < δtδb/2 for δ > 3/5. So rejection is not a profitable deviation.

Claim A.8 puts a bound on θ(xtk).
Claim A.8 For every xtk ∈ [0, 1/2], it holds that θ(xtk) < δ(b− b).
Proof: It follows from the definition that θ(xtk) <
1
2
b− b. Hence
δb− θ(xtk) > δb− 12b+ b = (δ − 12)b+ b > (δ − 12)2b+ b = 2δb > δb,
where we have used the fact that δ > 3/5 and b > 2b > 0. 
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Claim A.9 shows that, after any responder history h, the responder with the higher
share, jt, has no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Claim A.9 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt, xt). Player jt has no profitable one–shot
deviation from s at h.
Proof: According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts xt if
• [xt = ρt(h)] or
• [xtk ≤ δb and xtj ≥ δb] or
• [δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk] or
• [xtk ≥ δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb],
and rejects otherwise. We consider five cases:
1. xt = ρt(h),
2. xt 6= ρt(h) and [xtk ≤ δb or xtk ≥ δb/2] and xtj ≥ δb - the proof is the same as in
Claim A.3,
3. xt 6= ρt(h) and [xtk ≤ δb or xtk ≥ δb/2] and xtj < δb,
4. xt 6= ρt(h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk,
5. xt 6= ρt(h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj < δb+ δb− xtk.
The behavior of Player jt is irrelevant if Player kt responds after Player jt and accepts.
So in the following we only need to consider the case where Player kt moves before Player
jt or Player kt moves after Player jt and rejects.
Case 1. xt = ρt(h).
First we argue that if xt = ρt(h), then xtj ≥ δb. If xt = a, then xtj ≥ δb. Moreover, any
proposal in Table 1 satisfies xtj = δb or x
t
j = δb. And any proposal in Table 3 offers the
responders the shares δb and θ(xt−1k ), or the shares δb− θ(xt−1k ) and 0, or δb− θ(xt−1k ) and
θ(xt−1k ). In view of Claim A.8, in either case one of the two responders is offered at least
δb, so xtj ≥ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts, leading to a payoff δtxtj ≥ δt+1b. If
Player jt deviates and rejects xt, this leads to an expected payoff of δt+1(1− δb)/3 = δt+1b.
So rejection is not a profitable deviation.
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Case 3. xt 6= ρt(h) and [xtk ≤ δb or xtk ≥ δb/2] and xtj < δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects, leading to an expected payoff of
δt+1((1− δb)/3+ 2δb/3) = δt+1b. If Player jt deviates and accepts, he receives a payoff less
than δt+1b. So acceptance is not a profitable deviation.
Case 4. xt 6= ρt(h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts, leading to a payoff of at least
δt+1b+ δt+1b− δtxtk. If Player jt deviates and rejects, this leads to an expected payoff of
δt+1(
1
3
(1− δb− θ(xt−1k )) +
2
3
(δb− θ(xt−1k ))) = δt+1(b− θ(xt−1k )) = δt+1b+ δt+1b− δtxtk,
where we used (3.1) and the fact that θ(xtk) = x
t
k/δ − b. So rejection is not a profitable
deviation.
Case 5. xt 6= ρt(h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj < δb+ δb− xtk.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects, leading to an expected payoff of
δt+1b + δt+1b − δtxtk. If Player jt deviates and accepts, this gives him a payoff of at most
δt+1b+ δt+1b− δtxtk. So acceptance is not a profitable deviation. 
Claim A.10 shows that a proposal xt 6= ρt(h) which gives to the proposer more than
1− δb is rejected by both responders.
Claim A.10 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt). A proposal xt 6= ρt(h) such that
xtpt > 1− δb is rejected by both responders.
Proof: Note that xtj + x
t
k < δb. Since k
t is the responder who is offered the smaller share,
we have xtk < δb/2. We consider 2 cases:
1. xtk ≤ δb,
2. δb < xtk < δb/2.
Case 1. xtk ≤ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the proposal as xtk ≤ δb < δb/2.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects the proposal as xtj < δb.
Case 2. δb < xtk < δb/2.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the proposal as xtk < δb/2.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects the proposal as
xtj ≤ 1− xtpt − xtk < 1− (1− δb)− xtk = δb− xtk < δb+ δb− xtk.
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Claim A.11 shows that after any proposer history h, the proposer has no profitable
one-shot deviation from s at h.
Claim A.11 Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1). Player pt has no profitable
one-shot deviation from s at h.
Proof: First we argue that following s leads to a payoff of at least δt(1 − δb) for Player
pt. If ρt(h) = a, then atpt ≥ 1 − δb. Otherwise, according to s, the proposer demands one
of the four shares: 1 − δb, 1 − δb, 1 − δb + θ(xtk), and 1 − δb − θ(xtk). Each of these is at
least 1− δb, where the fact that 1− δb− θ(xtk) is at least 1− δb follows from Claim A.8.
If Player pt proposes xt 6= ρt(h) such that xtpt > 1 − δb, then the proposal is rejected
according to Claim A.10 and the expected payoff for Player pt is equal to δt+1((1− δb)/3+
δb/3) ≤ δt(1− δb).
If Player pt proposes xt 6= ρt(h) such that xtpt ≤ 1 − δb, then the proposal is either
accepted and leads to a payoff of δtxtpt ≤ δt(1− δb), or is rejected and leads to an expected
payoff of δt+1((1− δb)/3 + δb/3) ≤ δt(1− δb). 
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